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BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH SAFETY DURING
QUARANTINE: THE U.S. AND CANADA
Erin M Page*
Children and adults often try to claim that they are sick in order to
stay home from school or work for a day. However, when a person is genu-
inely sick for any period of time, the relief or even joy of staying home
quickly dissipates, turning into a desire for normalcy. What happens when a
person is forbidden from leaving home or another place of confinement,
even when that person thinks that he is no longer ill? In the rare instance of
quarantine, the government can force a person to stay confined even if the
person desires to leave.
For the purposes of this paper, quarantine is defined as when the
government or a government entity, a board of health, police chief, or the
National Guard, restricts a person to a particular geographic location due to
that individual having or being exposed to a contagious disease. Quarantine
is a severe measure that is not to be used for every cold or virus, but rather
for extreme outbreaks of especially contagious diseases such as tuberculosis
or bioterrorism-related attacks of diseases such as smallpox or anthrax.
Those quarantined are "unable to participate normally in daily life" as they
cannot leave their quarantined location without permission.'
Bioterrorism is neither a new phenomenon 2 nor one that is likely to
disappear in the near future.3 Historical authority for quarantine stems from
the idea that a public health contract, under which "individuals agree to
forgo certain rights and liberties, if necessary, to prevent a significant risk to
* Erin Page, J.D., is a Senior Fellow in Terrorism and Homeland Security at the Institute
for Global Security, Law & Policy at Case Western Reserve University School of Law and
Presidential Management Fellow. The author would like to thank Professor Guiora for his
unwavering support and guidance.
1 Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far are Limitations on
Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REv. 1105, 1128 (2003).
2 See Matthew E. Brown, Reconsidering the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:
Toward State Regionalization in Bioterrorism Response, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 95, 101-02
(2005) (documenting the presence of bioterrorism and biowarfare in the sixth century and the
origins of modern biowarfare in Japan and the United States in the 1930s and 1940s).
3 Biological weapons are attractive to terrorists because they are easily developed, pur-
chased, and transported due to their small and portable nature. Id. at 103-04.
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other persons."4 This contract is not only between an individual citizen and
the government, but also among citizens to each other.
"Without protection of health, safety and security, people cannot
enjoy many of the personal and economic freedoms that we have come to
take for granted."5 In order to achieve these goals, society must reach a bal-
ance between the extremes of complete protection of public health without
any protection of individual rights and total protection of individual rights at
the expense of public health. The equitable distribution of benefits and bur-
dens would demonstrate an appropriate balance of public health and indi-
vidual rights, a "mark of a desirable public health policy.",
6
This paper will discuss U.S. state government decisions regarding
elements of quarantine and individual rights, whether and when the federal
government can become involved, and the tensions between state govern-
ment and federal government. After analyzing the U.S. handling of quaran-
tine, Canada's quarantine laws will be briefly addressed. Issues of quaran-
tine are especially important in today's world, with the increasing threat of
bioterrorism. It is in the public's best interest for the state and federal gov-
ernments to know what they can and cannot do before a bioterrorist attack
occurs, instead of waiting until after an attack to discover uncertainty and
confusion in their roles and responsibilities.
I. U.S. STATE GOVERNMENT
"Among all the objects sought to be secured by governmental laws
none is more important than the preservation of public health.",7 While pub-
lic health powers were originally both state and federal, a dispute arose be-
tween these powers when the federal government took a more active role in
regulating quarantine. 8 The federal government lost the conflict and
"[t]oday, states are primarily responsible for the exercise of public health
powers."9 The state government that has primary control and authority for
creating quarantine laws and "from an early day the power of the States to
enact and enforce quarantine laws for the safety and protection of the health
4 Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the
United States: Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and Possible Conse-
quences, 286 JAMA 2711, 2712 (2005).
5 Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health
and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 6 (2003).
6 Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far are Limitations on
Human Rights Justified, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 524, 527 (2003).
7 Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d 648, 649 (Fla, 1952) (quoting People v. Robertson, 134 N.E.
815, 817 (Ill. 1922)).
8 See Barbera et al., supra note 4, at 2712.
9 Id.
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of their inhabitants has been recognized by Congress."1° The ability of a
state to enact measures to protect pubic health is part of the police power of
the state.'
The right of the states to pass and regulate quarantine laws has also
been recognized by the judiciary at the national and state level. In Railroad
Co. v. Husen, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized "the right of a state to
pass sanitary laws, laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property
within its limits, laws to prevent persons and animals suffering under conta-
gious or infectious diseases, or convicts, from coming within its borders."' 2
The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the state's right to enact quarantine laws
in 1922 with Ex Parte Company. The court stated that "the power to so
quarantine in proper case and reasonable way is not open to question. It is
exercised by the state and the subdivisions of the state daily.' 3 The District
Court of Appeals in California in Ex Parte Johnson also confirmed the right
of a state to create quarantine laws, stating that "the adoption of measures
for the protection of the public health is a valid exercise of the police power
of the state, as to which the Legislature is necessarily vested with large dis-
cretion, not only in determining what are contagious and infectious diseases,
but also in adopting means for preventing their spread.' 4 This statement
can be interpreted broadly to encompass the right to adopt quarantine laws
as a means to prevent the spread of disease. Therefore, states have an unde-
niable right to implement quarantine laws as they see fit according to their
police power.
The power and ability to create quarantine laws has limits. A state
has the power to create quarantine laws, but does not have the right to abuse
that power. In creating quarantine laws, a state has to balance the rights of
the individual to be free from government intrusion and the state's duty to
protect public health. By the same token, just because the authority for
quarantine "may, in a given case, be abused is no legal reason for denying
the power to quarantine summarily in a case where grounds therefor [sic]
concededly exist."' 5 Thus, the mere opportunity for abuse of quarantine
power by a state is not enough to prevent the implementation of quarantine
10 Compagnie Francaise de Navigation A Vapeur v. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 287
(1920).
II See Moore, 57 So.2d at 649 ("The duty to preserve the public health finds ample sup-
port in the police power, which is inherent in the state, and which the state cannot surren-
der.").
12 Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (citing R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472
(1877)).
"3 139 N.E. 204, 206 (Ohio 1922).
14 Ex pare Johnson, 180 P. 644, 644-45 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919) (all judges concur-
ring).
15 Id.
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measures. To establish the abuse of power in a specific case, one must dem-
onstrate that the quarantine in that particular instance is arbitrary and unjus-
tified.
16
"With the increase of population, the problem of conserving the
health of the people has grown, and public health officers and boards have
been appointed for the purpose of devising and enforcing sanitary meas-
ures."' 17 Within the state government, a board of health at the local or state
level often determines the pragmatic concerns of quarantine. These prag-
matic issues include the necessity of quarantine, the locations of quarantine,
and the methods of enforcement. In California, "[e]ach health officer is di-
rected to use every available means to ascertain the existence of, and imme-
diately to investigate, all reported or suspected cases ... within his jurisdic-
tion and to ascertain the sources of such infection."' 18 These means include
many options, such as gaining access to patients' private medical records,
requiring physicians to report the occurrence of certain types of illnesses, or
monitoring prescription medications.
A. Location of Quarantine
Individuals with an infectious disease or with exposure to one,
"whose behavior or movements pose a significant risk of harm to their
communities cannot legitimately claim to possess a 'right' to be free from
interference necessary to control the threat."'19 In those instances no right to
be free from interference exists because "public health powers may limit
personal interests in autonomy . . . privacy . . . free expression, and lib-
erty.",20 According to the Ohio Statute for quarantine regulations, quarantine
may be imposed on "vessels, railroads, or other public or private vehicles
conveying persons, baggage, or frieght, or used for such purpose",2 1 of con-
veying materials and people. In Ohio, a person subject to quarantine need
not actually have the contagious disease at issue; any person "known to
have been exposed" to such a communicable disease can be quarantined.22
The "board shall at once cause such person to be separated from susceptible
persons in such places and under such circumstances as will prevent the
conveyance of the infectious agents to susceptible persons., 23 The statute
16 See id.
17 Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d 648, 649 (Fla. 1952) (quoting People v. Robertson, 134 N.E.
815, 817 (I11. 1922)).
18 In re Halko, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 662 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
19 Gostin, supra note 6, at 526.
20 Id. at 524.
21 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3707.04 (LexisNexis 2005).
22 § 3707.08.
23 Id.
[Vol. 38:517
BALANCING RIGHTS AND SAFETY
further provides that such a person can be restricted to his place of residence
or another suitable place as determined by the board of health24 to curb the
spread of the illness. The location of the quarantined person also must have
a placard on the premises25 to notify the public.
Other states' statues also provide public health powers, including
"compulsory examination and treatment, emergency detention and quaran-
tine.",26 Quarantine locations in other states can include in-home isolation (a
person and those with whom he lives are unable to leave the residence and
others are not allowed into the residence) or commitment to state facilities.27
B. Length of Quarantine
"Quarantine will not be over quickly' 28 because a person may be
quarantined by the State until such time as he is no longer contagious, how-
ever long that may be. "The law reasonably assumes that consecutive orders
for quarantine may" be issued "so long as any person continues to be in-
fected with tuberculosis and on reasonable grounds is believed by the health
officer to be dangerous to the public health. 2 9 Under Ohio Statute, "[n]o
person isolated or quarantined by a board shall leave the premises to which
he has been restricted without the written permission of such board until
released ...in accordance with the rules and regulations of the depart-
ment. 30 Therefore, it is up to either the local department or board of health
to terminate quarantine.
While other states have different rules or regulations describing the
end of quarantine, generally "[r]elease is accomplished when a determina-
tion is made that the person is no longer a threat to the public health, or no
longer infectious.",3' Each state determines what it means to no longer be a
threat; some states require specific testing before release while others
vaguely provide for release when an individual is no longer a threat, without
any explanation of that terminology. Individual quarantine may seem like a
temporary measure, but it could last for several years if the person continues
to show symptoms of the disease or to be contagious to others.32
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Paula Mindes, Tuberculosis Quarantine: A Review of Legal Issues in Ohio and Other
States, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 403, 409 (1995-96).
27 Id
28 Barbera et al., supra note 4, at 2714.
29 In re Halko, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 664 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.08 (LexisNexis 2005).
31 Mindes, supra note 26, at 410.
32 See In re Halko, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 622 (Petitioner Halko was isolated because of active
tuberculosis at a hospital under the orders of a health officer. He was served with successive
2006-2007]
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C. Enforcement
According to Ohio Statute, a city's board of health, general health
district, or department of health has the ability to enforce the restrictive
measures of quarantine as prescribed by the department.33 Thus, in Ohio,
each individual city board of health could enforce the quarantine differently;
the statute does not require state-wide standardization. Also, according to
Ohio law, the board of health of a city or general health district "may em-
ploy as many persons as necessary to execute its orders and properly guard
any house or place containing any person affected with or exposed to a
communicable disease declared quarantinable by the board or department of
health. 34 Consequently, in one location, twenty people could be required to
guard a quarantine site, while another jurisdiction in the same state could
employ no guards to enforce the quarantine.
In Ohio, one department or board of health might enforce quaran-
tine by asking for local police involvement, while a department or board in
the neighboring area could create all new "quarantine guards, [who] ...
have police powers, and may use all necessary means to enforce sections
3707.01 to 3707.53, inclusive, of the Revised Code, for the prevention of
contagious or infectious disease, or the orders of any board made in pursu-
ance thereof.'' 35 No rules or regulations limiting the power or training re-
quirements of these quarantine guards seem to exist. Furthermore, unless
board-created orders stipulate the termination, there seems to be no indica-
tion of when these powers might end.
A board should take all possible measures to ensure that the crea-
tion of quarantine guards does not lead to abuse. One important measure
that could be taken to prevent abuse is preparing for a quarantine, "making
the trade-offs [between individual liberty and a safer and healthier popula-
tion] knowingly in advance of a public health emergency. 36 Through ad-
vance discussions and specific qualifications and limitations on quarantine
regulations prior to an outbreak of disease, a board can avoid many potential
problems.
During Dark Winter, a simulation exercise in 2001, prominent poli-
ticians played the roles of crucial actors who were dealing with a release of
orders of isolation for periods of approximately six months each from January 1965 to March
1966. Halko was still being held in isolation when he sought a writ of habeas corpus on May
5, 1966.).
" § 3707.09.
34 Id. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3701:3-02 (2006) for a list of diseases that are dangerous to
the public health and are reportable.
31 § 3707.09.
36 Gostin, supra note 1, at 1108.
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smallpox in shopping malls in Oklahoma City, Philadelphia, and Atlanta.37
This exercise illustrated how underprepared the relevant government agen-
cies were for a bioterrorism situation. "The rapidly spreading disease
quickly overwhelmed the health care system" and the politicians realized
how little they knew about the proper course of action in such a situation. 38
In another exercise, TOPOFF, federal and state governments simu-
lated the intentional dispersal of plague.39 In that simulation, the plague was
released in Denver, Colorado, which received domestic preparedness train-
ing and equipment prior to the simulation. 40 Even with that advantage, exer-
cise participants recognized "that the systems and resources now in place
would be hard-pressed to successfully manage a bioweapons attack such as
that portrayed in TOPOFF.'
The local boards or departments of health are the first faced with
the role of balancing the rights of the individual who may be infected or
exposed to a disease and the rights of the public to be healthy and safe. The
initial actions of the board of health largely determine the subsequent ac-
tions taken by individuals and groups involved in quarantine. Theoretically,
a board of health could be so thorough and thoughtful in drafting its regula-
tions that actual quarantine enforcement would require only minimal steps.
However, history and the failure of simulated exercises such as Dark Winter
and TOPOFF demonstrate that such a level of advance preparation has yet
to actually happen.42
The National Guard of a State can help enforce quarantine as long
as it is operating as a state actor pursuant to Title 32 of the U.S. Code.43 If
the National Guard is functioning as a state actor, it may be used by the
local board or department of health to assist in civil law enforcement (for
example, the enforcement of quarantine). The local board can draw on the
National Guard as a base from which to draw quarantine guards, which ef-
3 Id. at 1125.
38 Id. at 1126.
3 See id.
40 See id. at 1126-27.
41 Id. at 1127.
42 Brown, supra note 2, at 109-12 . "Throughout the exercise, participants [in TOPOFF]
noted their confusion as to who had ultimate decision-making authority regarding issues such
as... quarantines." Id. at 110.
43 See Craig T. Trebilcock, The Myth of Posse Comitatus, J. HOMELAND SEC., Oct. 2000,
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/joumal/articles/Trebilcock.htm. Trebilcock explains that
"[t]he National Guard, when it is operating in its state status pursuant to Title 32 of the U.S.
Code, is not subject to the prohibitions on civilian law enforcement," and that "[iun fact, one
of the express missions of the Guard is to preserve the laws of the state during times of
emergency when regular law enforcement assets prove inadequate." Id. Thus, the National
Guard could help enforce quarantine when necessary during a national emergency.
2006-2007]
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fectively eliminates the need to acquire additional guards from the general
public.
D. Due Process Requirements
"The protection of the health and lives of the public is paramount,
and those who by conduct and association contract such disease as makes
them a menace to the health and morals of the community must submit to
such regulation as will protect the public." 44 In submitting to regulations
that protect the public, the individual is often vulnerable. Even though thirty
three states allow for the quarantining of people in their homes, in "most
cases, there are no due process protections specified out in the law."
45
Under parens patriae, the State can act as it sees fit to protect a
public interest. Protecting public health is certainly a public interest; there-
fore, the State could act to protect under parens patriae. Through this, "just
as governmental powers relating to intelligence, law enforcement, and
criminal justice curtail individual interests, so too do public health pow-
ers.'' 46 However, individual states have taken different views as to the role
they should play to ensure individual rights are protected. In determining
the amount of protection to give to individual rights, "the liberty interests of
the individual must be balanced against the severity of the threat [he or she]
is alleged to pose to society.""7 In Arkansas, State v. Snow, the court states
that a statute allowing for involuntary commitment of persons with active
tuberculosis must be "strictly construed to protect the rights of the citizen"
because it is similar to an insanity commitment proceeding. 48 "Quarantine is
the most drastic of a number of measures used to control infectious dis-
ease," so a person's liberty should not be restricted unnecessarily.49 As the
most drastic measure, it should also be the measure most heavily regulated
to prevent individual rights from disappearing completely.
In West Virginia, a person who is to be involuntarily quarantined is
protected by all of the "procedural safeguards set forth in State ex rel.
Hawks v. Lazaro," a case outlining the procedural safeguards for involun-
tary commitment for the mentally ill, becaiue the quarantine "impinges
upon the right to 'liberty, full and complete liberty' no less than involuntary
commitment for being mentally ill."'50 The aforementioned rights include:
44 Exparte Company, 139 N.E. 204, 206 (Ohio 1922).
45 Mindes, supra note 26, at 409.
46 Gostin, supra note 1, at 1106.
47 Mindes, supra note 26, at 415.
48 State v. Snow, 324 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Ark. 1959). The court noted, however, that "the
analogy [to involuntary commitment of insane persons] must not be carried too far." Id.
49 Mindes, supra note 26, at 407.
50 Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980).
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(1) "adequate written notice detailing the grounds and underlying facts on
which commitment is sought; (2) the right to counsel and, if indigent, the
right to appointed counsel; (3) the right to be present, to cross-examine, to
confront and to present witnesses; (4) the standard of proof to be by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence; and (5) the right to a verbatim transcript of
the proceedings for purposes of appeal. 51
As described above, courts have held that a person does not lose
fundamental rights or guarantees just because that person becomes ill with a
contagious disease or is exposed to a contagious disease. While the gov-
ernment may restrict such a person's movement and freedom in ways that it
could not with those who are healthy and unexposed, the government can-
not and should not be allowed to completely disregard a person's rights.
Before determining whether quarantine is applicable to a situation, a board
of health should identify the particular disease of concern, the elements of
the disease, and the attributes of the disease. For example, quarantine for
AIDS has been rejected because one cannot contract AIDS by simply mak-
ing casual contact with an infected person. Therefore, one factor to consider
is whether quarantine will effectively help limit the spread of the disease.
While "the 'public health' justification may be invoked as a ground
for limiting certain individual interests to deal with a serious threat to indi-
viduals or the health of the population," 52 it does not require complete dis-
regard for a person's basic fundamental rights. As the Florida Supreme
Court noted, "[g]enerally speaking, what laws or regulations are necessary
to protect public health and secure public comfort is a legislative question,
and appropriate measures intended and calculated to accomplish these ends
are not subject to judicial review." 53 However, courts will interfere when the
"regulations adopted for the protection of the public health are arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable. 54 One of the ways in which the courts could
ensure the due process rights of those affected by quarantine laws is to make
risk assessments on a "case-by-case basis. Individualized risk assessments
avoid decisions made under a blanket rule or generalization about a class of
persons."55
"Constitutional guarantees of life, liberty and property, of which a
person cannot be deprived without due process of law, do not limit the exer-
cise of the police power of the State to preserve the public health so long as
that power is reasonably and fairly exercised and not abused., 56 For exam-
51 Id.
52 Gostin, supra note 6, at 525.
53 Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d 648, 649 (Fla. 1952).
54 id.
55 Gostin, supra note 6, at 526.
56 Moore, 57 So.2d at 650.
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pie, in West Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals requires more stringent
protections for individual rights. In Greene v. Edwards, the court held that a
person who is to be involuntarily quarantined due to a contagious disease
must be given the right to counsel, ability to cross-examine, confront and
present witnesses, and be committed only upon "clear, cogent and convinc-
ing proof., 57 Greene was involuntarily confined to a hospital pursuant to the
Tuberculosis Control Act. While Greene received notice of the commitment
hearing, he was not informed that he was entitled to have counsel represent
him at the hearing. Mr. Green, therefore, did not have an attorney at the
hearing and so the court appointed an attorney for him. Nonetheless, the
Court of Appeals stated that the right to counsel was not met because even
though the lower court appointed an attorney for Greene, they did not allow
Greene and his new attorney to consult privately before continuing with the
commitment hearing. The right to counsel is not universal across states.
Only thirteen states "explicitly grant the right to be represented by counsel
in any part of the proceedings" for commitment to treatment facilities.58
The new Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA)
aims to correct some of the shortcomings of state public health law and pro-
vide state pubic health departments with "more guidance in responding to
acts of bioterrorism. ' '59 The MSEHPA tries to balance the rights and liber-
ties of the individual with the right of the community to be healthy. It does
so by creating two kinds of public health powers, those which exists in a
pre-emergency environment and those only become effective after a state
governor declares a public health emergency.6°
While the MSEHPA has admirable goals, it does not address some
due process concerns. The quarantine provision of MSEHPA "allows health
officials to use 'every available means to prevent the transmission of infec-
tious disease and to ensure that all cases of contagious disease are subject to
control and treatment."'' 6' While the quarantine provision gives an individ-
ual the right to be heard by a court, the person can be held in quarantine for
57 Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980) However, this is not a universal
standard for all the states. See, e.g. Ex Parte Martin, 188 P.2d 287, 289 (Cal Dist. Ct. App.
1948) (holding that "it is [not] necessary for a health officer to first determine that one is
afflicted with such disease before subjecting such a person to quarantine, [as] all that is re-
quired is that there be probable cause to believe the person so held has an infectious disease
mentioned in said statutes").
58 Mindes, supra note 26, at 409-10.
59 Brown, supra note 2, at 96-97.
60 Gostin, supra note 5, at 16-17.
61 Brown, supra note 2, at 100 (quoting MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
§ 601 (Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s Health, Draft for Discussion 2001)), available at http://publ
ichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
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a maximum of fifteen days prior to actually being heard, and the public
health authority also "may petition for an extra ten days of isolation.,
62
It has also been argued that the government should have to demon-
strate that quarantine laws pass a "mean/ends test,,63 to satisfy the due proc-
ess requirements for quarantine. Under this test, "it is the government's bur-
den to defend, and rigorously evaluate, the effectiveness of regulation."
64
The government would have to defend and evaluate the legality of the quar-
antine and the details of its enactment to ensure that in each case, quarantine
is an effective means of protecting the public health ends. Forcing the gov-
ernment make this kind of analysis helps guarantee the due process rights of
the individual and helps to balance the rights of an individual against the
rights of the public.
The standard of proof for a state to quarantine is very low; the state
must only establish probable cause that a person is infectious. 65 With such a
low standard of proof required to institute quarantine, a state should un-
dergo vigorous self-examination to ensure quarantine is necessary, in order
to protect due process rights of the individual. Because time is of the es-
sence in a quarantine situation, perhaps the best way to balance conflicting
interests is to allow for immediate quarantine; however a hearing with a
representative of the individual and a court should be required within three
days of implementing quarantine. While this would still be subject to the
same criticisms as MSEHPA's hearing requirements, the critical issue is
finding the right balance of time. The possibility of being held in quarantine
for twenty-five days without a hearing is unreasonably weighted in favor of
the public health interest.
When applying West Virginia's standard to the rest of the United
States, "public health policies should be formulated and implemented in a
manner allowing public scrutiny and oversight., 66 Part of that oversight
should include the opportunity for all citizens to contribute to and critique
policy decisions, such as those which create quarantine.67 The best manner
to get full and rational discussion of a sensitive topic is to discuss it before it
is needed. Once personal interests are involved, such as when a friend or
loved one has been quarantined, people lose the ability to engage in logical,
rational discussions.
62 id.
63 Gostin, supra note 6, at 526.
64 id.
65 Victoria Sutton, Bioterrorism Preparation and Response Legislation-The Struggle to
Protect States' Sovereignty While Preserving National Security, 6 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REV.
93, 98 (2001) (citing Exparte Martin, 188 P.2d 287, 289 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)).
66 Gostin, supra note 6, at 527.
67 Id.
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Furthermore, a board should consider whether there are less restric-
tive ways to protect public health, as "public health authorities should adopt
the policy that is most likely to promote health and prevent disease while
incurring the fewest possible personal burdens. 68 Instead of automatically
quarantining for smallpox, the local boards of health could require manda-
tory vaccination for it. Local boards of health in Ohio also have the author-
ity to close any school and prohibit public gatherings for as long as neces-
sary in order to protect public health. 69 Therefore, in balancing the rights of
the individual, it may be less invasive and stigmatizing to individuals to
close schools or prohibit public gatherings than to tell certain individuals
they cannot leave their residence or treatment center and publicly indicate
quarantine.
II. U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
While public health law, including quarantine, is inherently a state
police power, the federal government has been involved in quarantine in the
past and can be involved when there is an "imminent threat to national secu-
rity."7° One of the largest problems with state government oversight of
quarantine, especially in the case of bioterrorism, is that the states do not
have the funding, employees, or resources to do an effective job. 71 The fed-
eral government would not face some of these same limitations, but it lacks
the authority the state governments possess. Federal government can only
be involved in quarantine in very few and limited ways.
A. Federal Government Involvement Under the Posse Comitatus Act
Under the Posse Comitatus Act, Congress limited the use of the
United States Army in civilian law enforcement. Originally passed in 1878,
the Act intended to remove the Army from domestic law enforcement and
"return it to its role of defending the borders of the United States. '72 In re-
moving the military from law enforcement, "the United States declared that
the military should never have enforcement powers against civilians, except
in a declared state of emergency., 73 However, the Posse Comitatus limita-
68 Id.
69 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.26 (LexisNexis 2005).
70 Sutton, supra note 66, at 97 (noting that Federalist 44 and 41 "indicate that the ascen-
dancy of the federal government may be favored where the exigency demands such a re-
sponse, and the existence of the Union is thus dependent upon such action... [wihile we are
certain that a bioterrorism threat exists, the exigency required by the Constitution to invoke
federal powers means there must be an imminent threat to national security").
7 Brown, supra note 2, at 97.
72 Trebilcock, supra note 43.
73 Victoria Sutton, Biodefense: Who's in Charge?, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 117, 143 (2003).
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tion does not apply to all branches of the armed services; its language spe-
cifically does not include either the Coast Guard or the National Guard.74
Posse Comitatus does not directly apply to National Guard units, as
they are under the control of state governors.75 National Guard units are not
subject to Posse Comitatus when used solely in a state manner as described
below. However, under the particular circumstances when National Guard
units are nationalized, they are subject to federal control and legal con-
76
straints.
In determining whether the federal military personnel are acting ap-
propriately in a given situation, the courts have applied a test of "whether
the role of military personnel in the law enforcement operation was 'pas-
sive' or 'active.' ' 77 Courts have stated that active participation such as mak-
ing arrests violates the Posse Comitatus Act, while passive supporting roles
do not.78 Federal military can provide "supplies, training, facilities, and cer-
tain types of intelligence information" and can be involved in the planning
of law enforcement operations without violating the Act.
The strength of Posse Comitatus has greatly diminished since the
time it was passed. It has been "repeatedly circumvented by subsequent
legislation" and diminished or disregarded by the actions of several presi-
dents.79 Congress has authorized military use in law enforcement for drug
trafficking, immigration, the Civil Disturbance Statutes, natural disasters,
and homeland defense.8° While the Posse Comitatus "remains a deterrent to
prevent the unauthorized deployment of troops at the local level in response
to what is purely a civilian law enforcement matter," it is a "hollow shell in
place of a law that formerly was a real limitation on the military's role in
civilian law enforcement and security issues." 81 The number of exceptions
and policy shifts in regards to Posse Comitatus over the "past 20 years
strongly indicate" that it is not a major barrier to the use of military forces in
the battle against terrorism.
8 2
74 Trebilcock, supra note 73.
75 Bonnie Baker, The Origins of the Posse Comitatus, AIR & SPACE POWER CHRON.
ONLINE J., Nov. 1, 1999, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af/mil/airchronicles/cc/bakerl.html.
76 Id.
77 Trebilcock, supra note 43.
78 Id.
79 Id. For instance, President Reagan used the Navy and Air Force in his "war on drugs."
Id. Congress approved this use in 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-81. U.S. troops were also used as secu-
rity during the 1996 Olympic games. Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 d
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B. Federal Government Involvement Under the Stafford Act
The Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, also provides limited authori-
zation for federal military involvement in certain instances. It "permits the
President to support state and local governments following a major disas-
ter." 83 According to the Stafford Act, a state governor may request use of
federal military personnel in times of natural disaster.84 However, the Act
requires that the state governor request help, and that the President declare a
major disaster and send in military forces on an emergency basis for up to
ten days to preserve life and property.85 In the case of a bioterrorist attack,
ten days may not be enough to really make a difference. Besides the ten day
restriction, a bioterrorist attack could only be declared a major disaster if it
produced a fire, flood, or explosion.86 Any actions taken by the military
under this authorization are also still subject to the active/passive test used
by the court to determine if the military has overstepped its bounds.87 The
time it would take for a state governor to request help may make the use of
federal troops and quarantine ineffective, limiting individual rights without
a corresponding increase in public safety.
C. Federal Government Involvement Under Civil Disturbance Statutes
Under the Civil Disturbance Statues or Insurrection Act, the Presi-
dent may "use military personnel to enforce civilian laws where the state
has requested assistance or is unable to protect civil rights and property. 88
These are the only instances, under this particular aspect of the code, where
the federal government can legitimately be involved in the enforcement of
quarantine. If the President does not formally issue an order to activate the
military for insurrection purposes, questions about the legality of the use of
the military under the Posse Comitatus Act exist89 and the use must comply
with the active/passive test previously articulated.
With the Insurrection Statute, the President must first give an order
for the offenders to disperse. 90 In the case of a bioterror attack, that is diffi-
cult to do. The President would only have the power to involve the federal
83 William Banks, The Normalization of Homeland Security After September 11: The Role
of the Military in Counterterrorism Preparedness and Response, 64 LA. L. REv. 735, 745
(2004).
84 Trebilcock, supra note 43.
85 Id.
86 Banks, supra note 83, at 745.
87 Trebilcock, supra note 43.
88 ld.
89 Sutton, supra note 73, at 145.
90 Trebilcock, supra note 43.
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government if those subject to quarantine staged a civil disturbance. If those
infected or exposed to the disease followed the orders of the local board of
health without questions, then the federal government would not need to get
involved, and also would have no authority to act. For the President to use
federal troops or federalize the National Guards under this Act, the Presi-
dent must think such actions necessary to enforce laws or suppress rebel-
lion.9' Therefore, sending federal troops to enforce quarantine seems to do
little to suppress any kind of rebellion unless the rebellion is by those who
are either infected with the disease or have been exposed to it.
D. Federal Government Involvement Under Inherent Presidential
Rights and Duties
Another way to authorize federal government involvement in quar-
antine is through the use of the President's inherent right and duty to pre-
serve federal functions.92 Along with the inherent right and duty to perse-
vere federal functions, the President has broad authority under Article II to
use federal troops to faithfully execute the laws.9 3 Such authority is weak
though, and should be a method of last resort by a President, as this area is
much more nebulous than interpreting well-defined Congressional acts.
E. Due Process
While it is "not improper to restrain the free enjoyment of liberty,
privacy or property per se," it is improper "to do so unnecessarily, arbitrar-
ily, inequitably, or brutally., 94 Because of federalism, states have the ability
to enact due process guarantees as they see fit. To ensure minimum protec-
tions for all those affected by quarantine statutes, federal regulations should
be enacted to establish a floor for protection of individual rights. This would
allow states to give those affected more rights, but also require states to
provide at least the minimum protections set by the federal level. The due
process considerations discussed in the State Government section of this
note also apply to the federal government. Having the federal government
set a floor for regulations and allowing the states to implement stricter con-
trols is not a new concept, as it aligns with the current legal system. The
U.S. Constitution sets minimum standards for all states, and a state can pro-
vide more stringent protections for its citizens if the state so desires.
91 Banks, supra note 83, at 746.
92 Trebilcock, supra note 43.
93 Banks, supra note 84, at 740.
94 Gostin, supra note 6, at 526.
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"When government acts to protect the population's health or safety,
it affirms the social and economic right to health. 95 However, the "compul-
sory interventions diminish individual interests ... this clash of individual
and collective interests is inevitable in the theory and practice of public
health. 96 Because the tension between rights and public health is inevitable,
the federal and state governments should both try to ensure that the mini-
mum due process rights that are guaranteed in criminal cases are also avail-
able and guaranteed for quarantine.97 While there are crucial differences
between a criminal proceeding and quarantine, there are also important
similarities. In both cases, a person is deprived of some of his liberty inter-
ests and freedom of movement. A crucial difference, though, is that a person
accused of a crime is entitled to certain rights and guarantees, such as the
right to an attorney, the right to a trial with a jury of his peers, the right to
confront and cross examine witnesses, etc.
If federal military personnel are used or there is a federalization of
the National Guard, then it is imperative that they realize the complexity of
their situation. The National Guard Units, as a whole and as individual
guardsmen or armed forces, will have to balance between public health and
individual rights. Unfortunately, they are not as well trained in civilian
peacetime law enforcement settings as they are for warfare conditions. En-
suring that the armed forces do not use deadly force unless absolutely nec-
essary is especially important. One might reasonably think that a member of
the armed forces is much more likely to use deadly force than an ordinary
cop. Thus, it is crucial, if the federal military personnel are to be involved,
that they respond to domestic law enforcement situations in the same man-
ner as a local police force or other domestic law enforcement group would.
III. TENSION BETWEEN U.S. STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
While police powers, and thus public health, have traditionally been
within the purview of state governmental authority, tension still exists be-
tween the state and federal government. The federal government, in the
past, has tried to play a larger role in quarantine laws. However, the states
fought such involvement, and the judiciary upheld that public health laws
" Id. at 525.
96 Id. at 525-26.
97 Earlier in the paper, the similarities between civil commitment hearings and quarantine
are discussed as far as making sure that in a quarantine situation, the same rights are given as
with the civil commitment. [See infra text accompanying footnotes 48-51]. An alternative
approach would require quarantine subjects to be granted the same rights as subjects of a
criminal proceeding, and it is those rights that are discussed in this section. This is not to
suggest that either view is correct, but rather to show that both civil and criminal standards
offer more guarantees to an individual than they get under quarantine laws and the best bal-
ance is likely somewhere in the middle.
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and quarantine fall squarely within a state's police powers. 98 However, a
report by the National Intelligence Council for the Central Intelligence
Agency determined that "infectious disease is not only a public health issue,
but also a problem of national security" because such diseases can be used
as bioterrorism. 99 Quarantine in a bioterrorism context raises new concerns
and tensions between state and federal governments, as this balance calcula-
tion includes protecting public health and national security.
Quarantine laws are traditionally state laws, but "the regulation of
national security has been exclusively given to the Congress through the
Constitution."' 00 This dichotomy between the public health power of the
state and regulation of national security by the federal government "has
given rise to a new conflict with federalism ... [t]his conflict suggests that
federalism should give way to the constitutionally delegated powers of the
United States to preserve national security."' 0 ' At the federal level, the Cen-
ter for Disease Control (CDC) "has Congressionally mandated authority to
impose quarantines where there is a threat of interstate transmission of a
communicable disease. 10 2 This power is based on Congress' power to regu-
late interstate commerce. 10 3 Under this, the "CDC shall only implement
those measures where the state's measures are 'insufficient to prevent the
spread of any of the communicable diseases from such State . . . to any
other." °4 Even though the CDC may have the most knowledge about a dis-
ease and how to curb its spread, it cannot get involved unless the state's
measures are insufficient.
As previously stated, quarantine laws are state regulations in peace-
time, "in accordance with the Tenth Amendment," and "not until there ex-
ists a national emergency, or an attack against the United State is made,
does the power to take control of a response shift to the federal govern-
ment."'0 5 Bioterrorist attacks are unlikely to be immediately identified as
such, creating tension between the state, which seems to have the right and
duty to respond first, and the federal government, which has the responsibil-
ity to protect national security.
One of the main problems with having separate regulations for each
state is that the boundaries between states are "meaningless where the attack
media, a disease agent, can travel from any one point on the globe to an-
98 Sutton, supra note 65, at 94.
99 Gostin, supra note 5, at 7.
100 Sutton, supra note 65, at 94.
101 Id. at 94-95.
102 Sutton, supra note 73, at 129 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2002)).
103 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
104 Sutton, supra note 73, at 129-30 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2001) (emphasis omitted)).
105 Id.
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other in under 36 hours."'106 This is part of the reason that the federal gov-
ernment has the power to take over regulation during a bioterrorist attack.
At that point, the federal government is better equipped to standardize ac-
tions for all states involved. Nevertheless, differing state responses to an
emerging crisis at the outset of the attack might lead to complications.
Even the federal government taking over control from the states
does not solve the incongruity or tensions. Taking control from the states
leaves much room for contradiction between the policies of the two levels
of government and also creates the possibility for conflict when either the
federal government wants to step in too soon or a state government is un-
willing to relinquish its regulatory. There is no clear indication of what is to
happen if the federal government and state government disagree as to
whether a bioterrorist attack has occurred. Perhaps at that point that the Su-
premacy Clause'0 7 takes effect, allowing the federal government to trump
the rights and actions of the state government.
IV. CANADIAN QUARANTINE LAWS
The Canadian approach to quarantine and the balance of individual
rights is much different from that taken by the U.S. government. In the U.S.,
the state or local government is the primary responder for a quarantine
situation. In Canada, the federal government has express jurisdiction over
quarantine. 108 Unlike the U.S. where each state legislature passes quarantine
laws, the Parliament of Canada passes "laws in relation to health for the
peace, order and good government of Canada," including quarantine
laws. 109
Having the federal government control the rules and regulations of
quarantine allows Canada to operate consistently throughout the country in
the event of a bioterrorist attack. Canadian citizens, residents, and aliens are
on notice that in the case of a bioterrorist attack, the quarantine rules are
standard, no matter where the individual is located at the time of the out-
break. This reduces some of the tensions the U.S. government faces be-
tween the state and federal governments.
In Canada, the Minister of Health chooses quarantine officers.
These officers do not require particular skills or knowledge; the Minister
may designate anyone whom he believes to be qualified." 0 A Canadian
106 Sutton, supra note 65, at 95.
107 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See also Sutton, supra note 65, at 94 (stating that scholars
disagree as to whether the Supremacy Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause grants the
federal government power to preempt states).
108 Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] S.C.R. 791.
109 Labatt Breweries v. Canada (Attorney General), [1980] S.C.R. 914.
110 Quarantine Act, R.S.C., ch. Q-l, § 4 (1985).
[Vol. 38:517
BALANCING RIGHTS AND SAFETY
quarantine officer has many of the same powers as quarantine officers in the
U.S. The quarantine officer has the power to: (1) inspect goods and cargo
arriving in or leaving Canada;' 1 (2) require others to assist him in carrying
out his duties;1 12 and (3) require a medical examination or detain an individ-
ual who has been in close proximity to a contagious disease, is ill, or may be
a carrier of the disease.
1 13
A. Location
Unlike the United States, Canadian detention or quarantine centers
are not determined on a local basis. Canadian quarantine stations are desig-
nated as such by the Minister of Health, and the Minister has the ability to
establish quarantine stations at any location in Canada. 1 4 These locations
include "any part of a quarantine station, harbour, airport or port of entry
into Canada."' 15
Once a quarantine officer determines that an individual must be de-
tained, the individual can be held "in a quarantine station, hospital or other
place having suitable quarantine facilities."'1 16 The individual cannot be held
longer than the length of the incubation period of the suspected disease,"
7
but cannot leave without permission of the quarantine officer."
18
B. Balancing of Rights
A person who has been quarantined in Canada has the right to an
immediate appeal of his detention decision. A detained individual must im-
mediately be informed of the reason for detention and the right to appeal to
the Deputy Minister of Health, or any person the Deputy Minister desig-
nates." 9 Additionally, if the person is to be held more than forty-eight
hours, the individual has the right to an attorney and a hearing regarding the
detention. 120 This provides a smaller pre-hearing detention time than the
U.S. MSEHPA, which, as discussed earlier, allows a person to be held fif-
teen to twenty-five days before a hearing.
I1 Quarantine Act § 5.
112 Quarantine Act § 6.
113 Quarantine Act § 8.
114 Quarantine Act § 3.
115 Id.
116 Quarantine Act § 8(3).
117 Quarantine Act § 8(2).
118 Quarantine Act § 3.
119 Quarantine Act § 9.
120 Quarantine Act § 12.
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For anyone held longer than forty-eight hours, the Minister of
Health must confirm the detention, inform the individual, and inform a
"judge of the superior court of the province in which the person is de-
tained., 12 Therefore, Canada explicitly provides for an expedited judicial
review of the quarantine detention. Judges must hear such cases within one
day of receiving notice and must "make an order revoking, varying or con-
firming the order for detention."' 22 This judicial review attempts to balance
individual rights against being held and the public health safety of the na-
tion. If the Minister does not inform a judge that an individual is being held
for more than two days within forty-eight hours of the order, the individual
must be released immediately.1 23 This strict penalty for failure to conform to
the law appropriately balances the rights of individuals.
V. CONCLUSION
While quarantine is rarely used and causes tension between the
rights of an individual and the public health of the nation, it also can be very
beneficial. During the SARS outbreak in 2003, the World Health Organiza-
tion acknowledged that the use of quarantines combined with surveillance
and travel restrictions, "sharply reduced the adverse effects of the out-
breaks.1 24 The U.S. federal and state governments must work together in
formulating a bioterrorist response, including quarantine, because "without
involvement by the federal government in a systematic way during peace-
time, there is little chance that an effective response to protect our nation
will be made in the context of an emergency shift in power."' 25 In Canada,
the federal government must maintain excellent communications with the
provinces as the federal government controls the bioterrorist quarantine
response.
The most difficult part of any quarantine law is determining how
much to protect individual rights and liberties while still keeping the public
healthy and safe. While this is true for any disease outbreak, it is especially
true in the case of a bioterrorist attack. With a bioterrorist attack, the num-
ber of people who are likely to either be infected or exposed to a contagious
disease would be so high that unless a local board of health had engaged in
advance planning, chaos would be rampant. "Government and public health
121 id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Gostin, supra note 6, at 526 (citing World Health Organization, First Global Consulta-
tion on SARS Epidemiology, Travel Recommendations for Hebei Province (China), Situation
in Singapore-Update 58 (May 17, 2003), available at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/
2003_05 17/en/print.html).
125 Sutton, supra note 73, at 121.
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officials must be able to react quickly and intelligently to a potentially
catastrophic disease outbreak."' 126 Reacting "intelligently" is crucial so the
government does not curtail individual liberties nor neglect the protection of
public health. This balance requires cooperation between the U.S. state and
federal governments to determine which roles each will play in the event of
a bioterrorist attack. "[B]ecause there is an inevitable tension between indi-
vidual and collective interests, finding an appropriate balance always will be
fraught with difficulty."
' 127
126 Gostin, supra note 5, at 9.
127 Gostin, supra note 6, at 527.
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